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ABSTRACT 
A number of very different conceptual approaches have been employed in 
human ecology. Th i s report reviews several of the most important analytic 
frameworks: environmental determinism and possibil ism, cultural ecology, 
the ecosystem-based model, and the actor-based model. The contributions 
made by each conceptual approach to increasing understanding of human 
ecology are described, and their strengths and weaknesses are assessed. F ina l -
ly, an alternative conceptual approach—the systems model of human ecol-
ogy—is proposed. In this interactive model, the human social system is seen as 
being l inked to its ecosystem through the interchange of energy, materials, and 
information. 
INTRODUCTION 
H u m a n ecology, most broadly defined as the study of human interactions 
with the environment, has in recent years gained greatly increased attention in -
all of the social sciences. Despite this, there appears to be little consensus as to 
what human ecology actually is or should be. In particular, there is cont inuing 
vigorous discussion about the suitability of applying several different theoreti-
cal approaches in understanding human-environment interactions. 
Wh/ ie such diversity of viewpoints within a scientific discipline may indicate 
youthful vigor, it also can present the nonspccialist with severe obstacles to 
gaining an understanding of the overall form and direction of the field of 
study. Th i s problem is made even more acute by the often polemic character of 
programmatic statements regarding the nature of human ecology. M a n y writ-
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ers approach theoretical discussions as i f they are dealing with theology, advo-
cating their own models as the only true and correct ones while dismissing 
other conceptual approaches as archaic, wrong-headed, or even immora l . 
Such out-of-hand dismissal may on occasion be deserved but also tends to 
obscure the existence of legitimate alternative conceptual approaches. 
In this report, alternative conceptual models of human relations with the 
environment are described in the historical order in which they have appeared 
in the scientific literature. Such a chronological approach helps to illustrate the 
interplay between research results and the formulation of new theoretical con-
cepts. N o superiority is imputed to more recently developed paradigms. In 
fact, certain currently popular models may be viewed as regressive from the 
standpoint of the development of social science theory as a whole. 
A l though largely discredited among social scientists, classical and early 
modern theories of environmental influence on human affairs (determinism 
and possibilism) are often employed by historians. Most notable of such histo-
rians is A r n o l d J . Toynbee, who advocates a possibilist stance in his influential 
A Study of H i s t o r y . 
The model of cultural ecology proposed by J u l i an Steward is still the guid-
ing paradigm for many investigators, but in recent years it has been chal-
lenged by the ecosystem-based model first proposed by And rew P. Vayda and 
Roy A . Rappaport . 
T he individual decision-making characteristic is the focus of actor-based 
models of human ecology, and the systems model of human ecology stresses 
investigation of interactions between human social systems and ecosystems 
based on their reciprocal exchange of energy, materials, and information. 
THE ORIGINS OF HUMAN ECOLOGY 
Since ancient l imes there have been many attempts to explain events in 
terms of environmental influences on human behavior. Astrology represents 
one early system of thought relating environmental forces to human actions. 
A l though wholly discredited as a scientific theory by modern astronomy, the 
belief that the movement of the stars controls human destiny retains a strong 
hold on the popular imagination, as evidenced by the appearance of astrologi-
cal advice columns in many daily newspapers. 
In a vein more compatible with modern scientific thought, the ancient 
Greek philosophers recognized that man was both influenced by nature and a 
force for change i n the environment. It was suggested, for example, that the 
different forms of political organization of the Greek city states and the East-
ern empires reflected the influences of climate on the personalities of their c i t i-
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zens. Th i s theme later was developed by Montesquieu and other French 
writers of the Enlightenment and advocated in recent times by the Amer i can 
geographer Samuel Hunt ing ton . Other classical writers commented on the 
destruction of the natural landscape of At t ica and No r t h Afr ica resulting from 
deforestation and overgrazing, a theme taken up i n the mid-1800s by George 
P. M a r s h , whose book, M a n a n d N a t u r e , or, P h y s i c a l Geography as M o d i f i e d by 
H u m a n A c t i o n was a precursor of the ecological catastrophe writings so popular 
recently. These early writings, however, were generally anecdotal rather than 
presenting a coherent theory of human-environment relationships. It was only 
with the development of geography and anthropology as scientific disciplines 
in the latter part of the nineteenth century that human ecology became the 
subject of systematic study. T h e first theoretical approach to be tried, however, 
was that of environmental determinism—a false start that greatly retarded 
subsequent development of human ecology. 
ENVIRONMENTAL DETERMINISM 
A r o u n d the turn of the century, geographers, notably Fr iedrich Ratzel in 
Ge rmany and his Amer i can disciple, El len C . Semple, espoused the view that 
humans were completely the product of their environment, a theory that came 
to be called environmental determinism. Followers of this school, which domi -
nated geographical thought well into the 1920s, asserted that all aspects of 
human culture and behavior were caused directly by environmental influences 
(Figure 1). For example, the Bri t ish were a nation of seafarers because they 
were an island-dwelling race surrounded by seas; the Arabs were monotheistic 
Mus l ims because l iv ing in the vast empty desert turned their minds toward a 
single G o d ; the Eskimos were pr imit ive nomads because the harsh conditions of 
their arctic habitat forbade their development into a complex c ivi l izat ion. The 
books of Semple and others were filled with endless listings of seemingly plau-
sible environmental determinants of cultural forms. 
A l though seductive when first encountered, such claims of causal correla-
tion between environment and culture were easily refuted once given careful 
consideration. For example, the Tasmanians, who l ived on an island not 
unlike the one inhabited by the Engl ish , made no ships; the A r ab tribes who 
had wandered that vast lonely desert for thousands of years before the appear-
ance of M u h a m m a d were believers in a large pantheon of spirits; and the icy 
wastes once traversed by Eskimo dog sleds are now the scene of snowmobile 
races alongside giant oil pipelines. There is s imply too much variation in 
human behavior in seemingly s imilar geographical settings for it t o be envi-
ronmentally determined. 




Figure 1. The model of environmental determinism. 
ENVIRONMENTAL POSSIBILISM 
In place of the discredited determinism, a new theory, called environmental 
possibilism, was proposed. Its proponents asserted that while the environment 
d id not directly cause specific cultural developments, the presence or absence 
of specific environmental factors placed l imits on such developments by either 
permit t ing or forbidding their occurrence (Figure 2). Thus , island peoples 
could be seafarers, but residents of Inner Mongo l i a could not be; inhabitants 
o f temperate regions might practice agriculture, but those l iv ing in arctic lati-
tudes could not. T he value of the possibilist approach was perhaps best dem-
onstrated by the Amer ican anthropologist A . L . Kroeber, who showed that 
the Indians of northwestern Nor th Ame r i c a could not adopt maize agriculture 
from their southern neighbors because the frost-free g rowing season i n their 
region was shorter than the four months required for the maize plants to reach 
maturity. The i r environment thus l imited the ability of their culture to evolve 
in an agricultural d irect ion. 
A possibilist stance was also taken by the Bri t ish historian A r n o l d Tbynbee 
in his mult ivolumed A Study of H i s t o r y (1947), in which he argued that the 
development of c ivil izations could be explained in terms of their responses to 
environmental challenges. Cul tures located i n the benign tropics failed to 
evolve because they were not sufficiently challenged by their environment; 
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Figure 2. The model of environmental possibilism. 
those in extremely harsh habitats such as the Eskimos in the arctic remained 
forever primitive because simply coping with the demands of their environ-
ment sapped all of their creative energies. O n l y those cultures in environments 
offering sufficient but not excessive challenges had the possibility of progress-
ing to higher stages of c iv i l izat ion. 
Possibil ism suffers from one overr iding defect as a scientific theory; it lacks 
any general predictive or explanatory power since it is able to explain only 
why certain developments could not occur in certain environments. It is 
totally unable to predict whether or not they would occur under favorable cir-
cumstances. For example, the failure of Eskimos to grow corn is explainable, 
but possibilism cannot explain why the English were great seafarers while the 
Tasmanians were not. Clearly, the difference in the latter case was due to exis-
tence of very different cultural traditions and bodies of technological knowl-
edge rather than reflecting environmental influences. In short, as the British 
anthropologist Da ry l l Forde concluded in his book, H a b i t a t , Economy a n d Society 
(1934), which was perhaps the last major scientific exploration of possibilism, 
"between the physical environment and human activity there is always a mid-
dle term, a collection of specific objectives and values, a body of knowledge 
and belief: in other words, a cultural pattern." 
W i t h this realization, social scientists tended to turn from studying human 
interactions with the environment, preferring instead to focus on the seeming-
ly more profitable study of the internal structure and functioning of cultural 
and social systems. Fo l lowing the French sociologist Emile Durkhe im 's i n -
junct ion that "social facts" could be explained only in terms of other social 
facts, cultural development was explained by the concept of diffusionism—the 
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historical spread of traits from one culture to others, without reference being 
made to possible environmental influences on the process. It was not unti l the 
1950s that social scientists, acting under the influences of J u l i an Steward's 
concept of cultural ecology, again turned serious attention to the study of 
human interactions wi th the environment. 
THE CONCEPT OF CULTURAL ECOLOGY 
Although his first papers on the subject were published in the early 1930s, it 
was not unt i l the mid-1950s that J u l i a n Steward's concept of cultural ecology 
began to exert a significant influence in Amer i can anthropology. Al though he 
was trained i n the diffusionist school, Steward's experience of field work 
among the Shoshone hunters and gatherers in the Great Basin of Nor th 
Ame r i c a had led h im to recognize that ecological adaptation had played at 
least as significant a role as diffusion in the formation of Shoshone culture. 
D r aw ing on the theoretical methods that biological ecologists were then devel-
op ing to study the adaptation of an imal species, in particular relating specific 
organs to specific features of the environment, Steward attempted to explain 
certain structural aspects of Shoshone culture in terms of the resources availa-
ble in the impoverished semi desert habitat. In what is still one of the finest 
ethnographies ever published, Steward (1938) made a convincing case that the 
low density of the Shoshone population, its organization into small family 
bands with highly dispersed and flexible residence patterns and lack of territo-
riality, and the lack of powerful permanent leaders all reflected the inabili ty of 
Shoshone technology to extract a large and stable supply of food from the 
thinly scattered and sporadically available resources of the a r id environment. 
It was Steward's view that not all aspects of Shoshone culture could be 
explained in ecological terms—many traits were present as s imply the acciden-
tal result of diffusion from neighboring tribes—but that only some elements, 
which he labeled as "the cultural core," had adaptive significance. In particu-
lar, he thought technology, economics, population, and social organization 
were l ikely to be part of the core, although he insisted that it was necessary to 
demonstrate this empirical ly in each case. H e tended to give special emphasis 
to the relationship between technology and the environment in his model of 
cultural ecology (Figure 3). * 
*lt is interesting to note that E. E. Evans-Prifchard, • leading British social anthropologist, sug-
gested a similar ecological approach at almost the same time as Steward although neither man 
appears to have been influenced by the other's work. Pritchard (19+0) related the' settlement pat-
tern of the Nucr pastorialisis of the Sudan to seasonal changes in resource availability. Despite the 
acclaim that his monograph met from his colleagues, Pritchard's ecological approach was not 
emulated by them and British social anthropologists were not to become involved again in human 
ecology research until much later than the Americans. 
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Figure 3. The model of cultural ecology. 
The Amer ican anthropologist Cl i f ford Geertz (1968) has applied Steward's 
concept of cultural ecology to explaining the great demographic disparity that 
exists between J ava and the outer islands of Indonesia. J a v a is one of the most 
densely populated regions in the wor ld , with an average density of 480 persons 
per square kilometer ( km 1 ) but with more than 2,000 persons/km 2 in some 
parts of the island. In marked contrast, most of the outer islands (e.g., Suma-
tra, Ka l iman tan , T i m o r ) are characterized by densities of less than 25 per-
sons/km' . Geertz has suggested that these various population densities reflect 
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the differing agricultural adaptations employed in the two regions, which in 
turn relate to their differing environments (Table I). 
The topography of J ava is one of relatively young volcanic mountains sur-
rounded by a series of gently sloping basins, which offer ideal conditions for 
construction of irrigated fields. The relief of the geologically older outer is-
lands is generally low and irregular, offering few opportunities for develop-
ment of large, gravity fed i rrigation systems. The rivers there also tend to be 
slow moving, capable of car ry ing only light sediment loads. In J ava , on the 
other hand, the rivers are short and fast moving, car ry ing large quantities of 
nutrient-rich sediments from the fertile young soils of the volcanic slopes down 
into the paddy fields. 
In conformity with these environmental factors, J a v a is predominantly a 
region o f s a w a h i rrigated wet rice agriculture while l a d a n g shifting cultivation is 
the principal technology employed in the outer islands. L a d a n g , or " sw idden" 
agriculture as it is usually called by anthropologists, is a system in which the 
farmer cuts a plot of land in the forest, allows the vegetation to dry and then 
burns it before planting a crop. After one or, at most, two harvests, fertility is 
exhausted and the plot is abandoned and a new field is cleared in the forest. 
The abandoned plot is gradually rcoccupied by forest vegetation, and after ten 
to fifty years it may again be cleared and farmed. Swiddening represents an 
effective adaptation to farming the impoverished soils of tropical rain forest 
areas where most of the available nutrients are stored i n the vegetation, It 
gives high yields with relatively low human labor inputs since most of the work 
is done by the fire, which simultaneously clears the field, releases the stored 
nutrients back to the soil in the form of ashes where they are readily available 
to the growing crops, and kills off pests and weed seeds that would compete 
with the crops. The major l imitat ion of swidden agriculture is that a large 
quantity of land is required to support each farmer. A n individual farmer 
requires not only the plot currently under cultivation but also a reserve of for-
est land adequate for the needs o f cult ivation unti l the old plots are again ready 
for c learing. Swiddening can thus support only populations at densities of 
fewer than 200 persons/km 3 . If population should increase, it is necessary 
to shorten the forest fallow cycle, causing rapid destruction of the productive 
capability of the land due to erosion and nutrient loss. 
In contrast to the impermanence and instability of the l a d a n g systems, sawah 
agriculture is noted for its stability and durability. Once an irrigated paddy 
field has been constructed it can be farmed year after year for centuries with 
little evident loss in productivity. Th i s reflects the fact that it is the supply of 
water rather than the quali ty o f soil that is the most important factor in grow-
ing wet rice. Moreover , the yield is strongly influenced by the amount of 
human labor put into working the crop—transplanting rather than sowing the 
seed by broadcasting, more careful and frequent weeding, and cleaning and 
maintenance of i rr igation channels all contribute to a higher yield of rice per 
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hectare. Such a system may encourage population increase, since the more 
children (he parents have, the more hands they have to help work their paddy 
field. Thus , the existence of these radically different systems o f agriculture, 
reflecting different ecological conditions, may contribute to the demographic 
disparities between J ava and the outer islands. 
Steward's concept of cultural ecology has proved to be a powerful and effec-
tive strategy for human ecological research, offering new understanding of 
how traditional societies arc effectively adapted to their environments, l i s 
successes have been achieved pr imari ly in studying small-scale, pr imitive so-
cieties, however, especially those where a stable relationship has been es-
tablished between a static population and an unchanging environment. The 
concept has been much less applicable to complex modern societies where 
the actions of large human populations are producing rapid environmental 
change with consequent need for rcadaptation of the cultural core. As con-
ceived by Steward and used by others, the cultural ecology model lacks any 
systematic conceptualization of the environment or o f the ways in which hu-
man activities impinge on it. Thus , its emphasis is almost exclusively on the 
human side of the human-environment equation, focusing on the adaptation 
of culture to nature while ignoring environmental change in response to hu-
man intervention. 
Th i s fundamental weakness of the concept of cultural ecology is revealed in 
the work of M a r v i n Har r i s , an Amer i can anthropologist who has incorporated 
this approach into studies of what he refers to as " tcchno-cnvironmenial deter-
min i sm." Opera t ing under the assumption that the technological means of 
adaptation to the environment is the prime mover of cultural evolution, Har -
ris asserts that the forms taken by all other aspects of culture are determined 
by the relationship between technology and the environment. In a widely cited 
paper, " T h e Cu l tu ra l Ecology of India's Sacred Ca t t l e " (1966). Har r i s argues 
that, contrary to the accepted view t h a t H i n d u s keep excessive numbers of 
useless cattle because of their religious belief that cattle are sacred, these cows 
are actually extremely important to the economic welfare of the poor peasants, 
helping them to make max imum use of the scarce resources of their environ-
ment. Therefore, he concludes, the religious beliefs must have been caused by 
techno-cnvironmental factors. 
Accord ing to the conventional view, between one-third and one-half of the 
80 mi l l ion cows in India should be eliminated as economically wasteful ani-
mals. Because they arc so badly nourished, not more than one cow in two 
yields any mi lk , and cattle wander freely around the landscape, damaging 
crops and interfering with traffic. In some areas cattle actually compete with 
humans for food, being kept in special bovine old-age care shelters until they 
die, since the H i n d u concept of a h i m s a that regards all life as sacred forbids 
their being slaughtered. Hence, it is commonly said that this is an example of 
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religious ideology interfering with the efficient ecological adaptation o f a cu l -
ture. 
Har r i s claims, however, with some justification, that conventional analyses 
of the economics of Indian cattle have overlooked numerous benefits thai the 
seemingly excess animals provide to the peasant population. First, he reminds 
the reader that cows are necessary to produce bullocks, which are the main 
draft an imal on Indian farms. It is only by having large numbers of cows that 
the demand of the farmers for bullocks can be met. Second, cows yield a 
steady supply of dung , and cow dung is the main source of fuel for domestic 
cooking fires in much of South As ia . Accord ing to one estimate, the energy 
value of the 300 mi l l ion tons of dung burned each year in India is equal to 35 
mi l l ion tons of coal . M u c h of the rest of the dung is used as manure in the 
fields. The hides salvaged from deceased cows also provide the basis of a large 
leather industry, which provides a l ivelihood for many lower-casle families. 
Not only does Harr is show that the cows provide many valuable economic 
benefits to the Indian peasants, he also argues that they do so at m in imal cost 
to the human population. He claims that cows rarely compete directly with 
people for food since they are not fed grain or fodder grown on land that could 
otherwise grow food for human consumption, as is the case in Western coun-
tries. Instead, the cattle wander grazing freely on whatever grass they can find 
g rowing beside roads, a round telephone poles, and between the ties on rail-
road tracks. They also arc allowed to graze on the stubble left in grain fields 
after the harvest. In other words, the cows capture otherwise unutil ized energy 
and nutrients in the environmeni and convert these into bullocks, mi lk , dung, 
and hides—all resources of great value to the peasants. Therefore, Harr is con-
cludes, far from the keeping of cows being caused by religious irrationality, the 
religious tabu on k i l l i ng cattle exists as an expression of the ecological value of 
cattle to the Indian human population. 
Ha r r i s ' paper has been subject to severe crit icism on empirical and theoreti-
cal grounds. It has been pointed out that he tends to overestimate the benefits 
that people derive from the cows while understating the costs of keeping such 
large herds. In particular, it has been claimed that 5 percent of the arable land 
in India is in fact used as pasture and for growing fodder to feed cattle, so these 
animals do in fact compete directly with humans for food. It has also been 
argued that a smaller number of belter fed animals would provide the same or 
better level of services to the human population at less economic cost. O n the 
theoretical side, it must be recognized that religious tabus on k i l l ing and con-
suming animals arc not necessarily always as adaptive as Har r i s seems to 
think. Such practices may, for example, appear to be ecologically rational 
when they first evolve, as Harr is has asserted to be the case with the M u s l i m 
prohibit ion on eating pork since pigs are poorly adapted to the arid environ-
ment characteristic of the Arab ian peninsula. Once in existence, however, reli-
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gious beliefs may take on a life of their own and can be diffused into new envi-
ronments where they may appear less rational ecologically. Thus , Mus l ims in 
Indonesia and Ma lays ia are forbidden by their religion from eating pork 
although the pig is ecologically probably the most efficieni meat-producing 
an imal that can be raised in the Southeast As ian tropics. Pigs are so important 
as a source o f protein, in Borneo the spread of Islam has been l imited to those 
areas close to the coast where sufficient supplies offish are available to provide 
a substitute for pork. Populations on the interior side of what has been called 
the " p i g l i n e " nutri t ionally cannot afford to become Mus l ims . 
The greatest weakness in Ha r r i s ' argument, however, is that in focusing on 
the benefits that individual Indian farmers derive from having large numbers 
of cows, he wholly ignores the destructive impact these animals have on the 
environment and the consequent lowering of the land's ability to support the 
total human population at acceptible levels. Overgraz ing has stripped most of 
the upland areas of South As i a of vegetative cover, and the barren soil of the 
h i l l slopes has had its structure destroyed by the impact of the cow's hooves 
and is highly subject to erosion du r ing the brief but intense monsoon rains. 
The rainwater, which was formerly trapped by tree roots and grasses and then 
gradually released providing irrigation water to farms on the plains below dur-
ing the growing season, now pours down the slopes in sheets, carrying away 
the topsoil and causing greai floods in the lowlands. T h a i the environmental 
degradation in India caused by cows exacts a heavy price in human hunger 
is clearly shown by the results of an experimental reforestation program at 
Sukhomajri in the hills north of Chandigar . There , each upland hectare that 
has been replanted and protected from grazing now yields sufficient water to 
irrigate two hectares of good cropland in the plains dur ing the dry season, 
more than doubl ing the supply of food available to the human population. 
A s the previous discussion of the l imitations of the concept of cultural ecol-
ogy indicates, research on human-environment relations needs a conceptual 
framework that pays adequate attention to the possibility of environmental 
change and degradation occurring as a consequence of human activities. C u l -
tural adaptation cannot be seen as static, something that is achieved at the 
beginning of a culture's history and then maintained unchanging ever after-
ward. Instead, the relationship between humans and nature is a dynamic one 
i n which both culture and the environment continue to adapt and readapt as 
each changes in response to the other's influence. It was recognition of the 
need for a more dynamic model of the environmental side of the relationship 
that Jed to formulation o f the ecosystem-based model o f human ecology. 
Conceptual Approaches to Human Ecology 
THE ECOSYSTEM-BASED MODEL OF HUMAN ECOLOGY 
Basing their approach on the concept of the ecological system that had been 
formulated by biological ecologists following Wor ld War II, Amer ican anthro-
pologists Andrew Vayda and Roy Rappaport suggested that instead of study-
ing how cultures are adapted to the environment attention should be focused 
on the relationship of specific human populations to specific ecosystems.* In 
their view, human beings constitute s imply another population among the 
many populations of plant and animal species thai interact with each other and 
with the nonl iv ing components (climate, soil , water) of their local ecosystem. 
Thus the ecosystem, rather than the culture, constitutes the fundamental unit 
of analysis in their conceptual framework for human ecology (Figure 4). C u l -
tural traits arc of interest only as they can be shown to contribute to the popu-
lation's survival in the context of the ecosystem. 
Such a framework, however attractive it might seem for reintegrating hu-
man ecology into general ecological th inking, serves to stand anthropology on 
its head by emphasizing the biological survival of populations rather than the 
persistence of the sociocultural systems in which these populations partici-
pale. Cu l tu ra l traits arc studied in terms of the possible contribution they 
make to a population's adaptation to its ecosystem rather than as being part of 
coherent systems in their own right, the traditional concern of social scieniists. 
Moreover , research following the ecosystem-based model tends to be guided 
by the unspoken assumption that if a cultural trait exists then it must somehow 
necessarily serve the adaptive needs of a local population. 
The ecosystem-based model of human ecology is exemplified by Roy Rap-
paport's well-known book. P i g s f o r t h e A n c e s t o r s (1968), in which he attempted 
to demonstrate how the religious rituals practiced by the Tsembaga tribal 
group of New Gu inea functioned to maintain their population in balance with 
the available resources of their environment. Re l ig ion , an institution that 
Steward had largely excluded from his concept of the ecologically adaptive cul-
tural core, was seen by Rappaport as playing a key regulatory role in relations 
between the Tsembaga population and the other components of their eco-
system. 
L ike many of the tribal groups of the central highlands of New Gu inea , the 
Tsembaga employ a swidden system of farming s imilar to that described by 
Geertz for the outer islands of Indonesia. The pr incipal domestic animal 
raised by these New Gu inea tribes is the pig. A cont inuing puzzle to anthro-
pologists has been their custom o f slaughtering animals only on ritual occa-
sions, when hundreds of pigs may be consumed in only a few days, while the 
' A n ecosystem consists of all (he living organisms and nonliving environmental elements (such as 
soil, water, and climate) (hat interact with each other within a spatially defined area. 















Figure 4. The ecosystem-based model of human ecology. 
people go meatless for most of the rest of the t ime. F rom a nutri t ional stand-
point, it would seem better to slaughter smaller numbers of animals on a regu-
lar basis to ensure more frequent consumption of protein by the human popu-
lation. The great r i tual feasts have therefore often been thought to be an 
example of a maladaptive cultural trait s imilar to the sacred cows of India. 
After spending fourteen months l iv ing among the Tsembaga, Rappaport 
concluded that, far from being a maladaptive feature of their culture, the rit-
ual regulation o f pig k i l l ing actually functions to better adapt the Tsembaga 
population to their tropical forest ecosystem. He asserted that the ritual re-
Cunteptual Approaches in Human Ideology 15 
strictiun of k i l l ing pigs only on certain ceremonial occasions serves to (1) max-
imize the supply of protein at times when the Tsembaga most need it, and (2) 
maintain the size of the Tsembaga population in balance with available re-
sources. 
Accord ing tu Rappaport , the Tsembaga are able to raise adequate supplies 
of carbohydrates in the form of sweet potatoes, taio, and sugar cane in their 
swidden plots, but they are chronically short o f protein, particularly high qual-
ity animal protein, which is necessary to ensure good health and resilience in 
the face of disease and injury. The fact that the l imited number of pigs that the 
Tsembaga are able to raise can be slaughtered only on ritual occasions asso-
ciated with illness, battle, and the beginning and end of periods of fighting 
may serve therefore to ensure that protein is available in significant quantities 
at precisely those times when it is most needed nutritionally. 
Illness, injury, wounds, and fear all place the human organism under greai-
cr than usual stress with consequent greater physiological demand for protein, 
the basic bu i ld ing block for bodily tissues. Individuals consuming an inade-
quate quantity of protein arc unable lo produce sufficient antibodies to recover 
quickly from stress effects and are more likely to die from even minor wounds 
or injuries than are better fed individuals . Even a temporary increase in pro-
tein intake can produce dramatic recoveries among such malnourished inva-
lids. Thus , even though the Tsembaga k i l l ing of pigs is done for supernatural 
reasons to appease evil spirits believed to cause sickness and ensure the help of 
ancestral spirits in fighting, since it occurs at times of illness and war it may 
allow the human population to derive the max imum nutritional benefit from 
the small supply of animal protein that their tropical forest ecosystem is capa-
ble o f producing. 
Rappapor i not only sees ritual as serving the nutri t ional best interests of the 
Tsembaga population; he further claims the ritual cycle functions to maintain 
the population ai a density compatible with the long-term carrying capacity of 
the ecosystem by regulating die frequency and intensity with which warfare 
occurs. Accord ing to the cultural ground rules followed by the tribes of the 
New Gu inea highlands, war is only permitted du r ing certain l imited periods, 
the beginnings and ends of which are signaled by great ritual pig feasts. No 
group can go to war, however great the provocation, unti l a sufficient herd has 
been assembled to hold a proper feast. Thus , the very ability of the Tsembaga 
to engage in war is determined by their ability to produce pigs, and their abil-
ity to raise pigs is determined by the overall state o f their ecosystem. 
Warfare of the sort practiced in highland New Gu inea until quite recently, 
while often more of a r i tual than a real battle, was on occasion quite a bloody 
affair with participating groups suffering heavy casualties. When their losses 
became unacceptable, the contending sides would generally declare a truce. 
Each side would retreat to its own territory for a special ritual in which v i r tu-
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ally all adu.li pigs in the communi ty were slaughtered. Some of this meat was 
eaten by the Tsembaga, but most of it was given to the men from neighboring 
villages who had served as their allies dur ing the fighting. 
D u r i n g the truce following the p ig feast, the Tsembaga were r i tually barred 
from engaging in new fighting. They believed they had not yet repaid their 
ancestral spirits for the help given to the l iv ing dur ing the just-concluded -
round of fighting and therefore they could not rely on their help again should 
new fighting begin. It was only after they held a second, larger festival involv-
ing the slaughter of hundreds of pigs that their debt would be considered paid 
and the ancestral spirits again thought w i l l i ng to help them. At that point war-
fare would again be ritually permitted. But having slaughtered so many adult 
pigs when the truce was declared, the Tsembaga would take many years to 
rebuild their herd to sufficient size to hold the second feast. D u r i n g those years 
the human population also had time to rebui ld, making up for the losses in 
warriors it had suffered dur ing the previous fighting. O n l y when both the pig 
population and the human populat ion 'had achieved sufficient size w o u l d the 
ritual cycle allow fighting to resume. R i t ua l , although triggered by the growth 
in the size of the pig herd, thus served to help keep the human population of 
the Tsembaga in balance with the l imited carrying capacity of their ecosystem. 
Rappaport 's book is widely admired for the ingenious way in which he finds 
possible l inks between such diverse elements as nutr i t ion, health, warfare, 
population size, pigs, and religious ritual wi thin the framework of the T sem-
baga ecosystem. O ther researchers have raised serious questions, however, 
both empirical and theoretical, about the validity of his analysis. Margaret 
M c A r t h u r (1974), a leading Austra l ian nutri t ional anthropologist, has shown, 
for example, that the Tsembaga are the best nourished of any highland New 
Gu inea population yet studied, with an average daily protein intake well in 
excess of reasonable m i n i m u m daily requirements. She concludes that Rappa-
port's assumption that the Tsembaga are highly vulnerable to the stress of i l l -
ness or injury is apparently unfounded. Even i f Tsembaga invalids would ben-
efit from a greater intake of protein, Rappaport presents no hard evidence that 
they in fact receive it from the pigs kil led at the cur ing rituals, according to 
McAr t hu r . As she notes, the fact that the sick person receives only the'liver as 
his share of the meat does not suggest ingestion of any very great quantity of 
protein. 
The k i l l ing of large numbers of pigs on festival occasions is also shown by 
M c A r t h u r to be an extremely inefficient way of using the l imited supplies of 
protein available to the Tsembaga. D u r i n g the feasts, people literally gorge 
themselves on pork, consuming as much as a k i logram of meat in a single day. 
Since the human body cannot store protein in excess of its small daily require-
ment of about 50 grams, the bulk of this intake at festival times is nutri t ionally 
wasted, being simply burned as extra calories. Cont ra ry to Rappaport 's analy-
sis, M c A r t h u r concludes the k i l l ing of pigs in smaller numbers at more frc-
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quent intervals would be more efficient from a nutri t ional standpoint. Such ' 
regular slaughter would also have greater ecological efficiency since it would 
remove pigs from the herd as soon as they reached maturity and ceased to be 
efficient converters of vegetable food to protein. Then the people would not 
have to support them for many extra unproductive years while wait ing for a 
large enough herd to be assembled to hold the r i tual feast. Far from maximiz-
ing the flow of energy and nutrients from the ecosystem to the human popula-
t ion, the ritual regulation of Tsembaga p ig husbandry thus appears to be 
highly wasteful and inefficient. 
O f course the Tsembaga are not concerned with ecological efficiency; they 
slaughter pigs for religious and social reasons and not because they are s tr iving 
to ensure the max imum flow of protein from the ecosystem to themselves. In 
particular, the mass slaughter of pigs at the end of a truce is intended to display 
the wealth and power of the tribe to potential friends and enemies alike while 
ensuring the support of both their ancestoral spirits and their human allies i n 
the next round of fighting. The mass consumption of pork on these occasions, 
however wasteful it may be from a nutr i t ional standpoint, serves the social 
needs of the Tsembaga by promoting the formation of effective alliances with 
needed allies in the coming war. The efficacy of the ritual slaughter should 
therefore be assessed, not as Rappaport has done in terms of the interaction of 
the Tsembaga population with their local ecosystem, but-in terms of the adap-
tation of the tribal society to the conflict-ridden social environment of the New 
Gu inea highlands. 
F r om the latter perspective, it is particularly i ronic that the Tsembaga had 
fallen v ic t im to the forces of their larger social environment, having been 
defeated in battle in 1953, dr iven off their ancestral lands, and forced to take 
refuge among their allies. As Rappaport himself reports, "the Tsembaga 
ceased to exist as a group after their defeat, and, i f it were not for the agents of 
the newly arrived Austra l ian government who offered to protect them, it is 
unl ikely that they would as a group have returned to their terr i tory" (1968). 
Such a group hardly seems an appropriate choice to illustrate a theory of the 
role that r i tual plays i n maintaining homeostatic balance between a local 
human population and its ecosystem. To the extent that balance is maintained, 
it would appear to be between human society in the highlands as a whole and 
the regional ecosystem, not between transitory local populations like the 
Tsembaga and the small territories they exploit directly. 
Despite the many serious criticisms of Rappaport 's study, it remains a valu-
able contribution to human ecology. Perhaps its greatest impact has been to 
focus attention on the adaptive significance or ideology, an aspect of culture 
that Steward had largely excluded from consideration as affecting human 
interactions with the environment. By suggesting plausible ways in which reli-
gious r i tual might regulate Tsembaga relations with other components of their 
ecosystem Rappaport opened the eyes of social scientists concerned with ccol-
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ogy to a new area of study. That his particular model of the interactions 
between r i tual , human population, and other ecosystem components may not 
be a val id one is a reflection on the specific conceptual approach that he 
employed, not a rejection of his more fundamental insight that religious ritual 
could be just as significant ecologically as the technological aspects of culture 
that Steward emphasized. 
The professional debates that followed publication of Rappaport 's book also 
have focused attention on what remains the greatest theoretical problem in 
human ecological studies—that of identification of the unit of human adapta-
tion to the environment. Whi l e some critics, of whom the present author is 
one, feel Rappaport erred in th inking too small and focusing on a local popu-
lation rather than the larger social system of the highlands as his unit of analy-
sis, others take the position that adaptation occurs p r imari ly at the level of die 
individual rather than at the level of groups, populations, or social systems. It 
is on the basis of the latter conviction that what has been called the actor-based 
model of human ecology has been formulated. 
THE ACTOR-BASED MODEL OF HUMAN ECOLOGY 
In the face of severe empirical problems in defining the social unit of ecolog-
ical adaptation, it has been suggested that adaptation occurs at the level of 
individuals rather than of cultures or populations. Th i s actor-based model of 
human ecology, as Or love (1980) has labeled it, has become the major new 
wave in human ecology. The model reflects both anthropologists' general con-
cern with individual decision-making processes and evolutionary biologists' 
current preoccupation with showing that natural selection operates exclusively 
at the level of the individual organism. F rom this perspective, any higher 
levels of organization, whether communit ies, ecosystems, or human social sys-
tems, exist only as the fortuitous outcome of interactions among many indi-
vidual organisms. 
In the case of human society, therefore, environmental adaptation is seen as 
occurr ing not as the result of natural selection on the cultural or social system 
level but rather as the result of the outcome of thousands of individual deci-
sions about how best to interact with the environment. Individuals are as-
sumed to be mak ing choices constantly about how to exploit available re-
sources while coping with environmental hazards. Those who make the 
"correct" choices wi l l survive and prosper; those who choose less wisely wil l be 
selected against. O v e r t ime, the more successful adaptive strategics wi l l be-
come institutionalized as cultural norms. Such norms, however, are no more 
than the statistical outcome of indiv idual choices and have no independent 
reality of their own as has been the usual conception of social scientists (F ig-
ure 5). 
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Figure 5. T h e actor-based model of h uman ecology. 
For example, an actor-based analysis of the Tsembaga might explain the rit-
ual cycle of p ig k i l l ing described by Rappaport as s imply the accidental out-
come of hundreds of separate decisions by individual tribesmen about how to 
best maximize the use of the l imited resources available in order to achieve 
power and prestige wi th in their society. Thus , while the success of the feast 
from the societal viewpoint is measured by the total number of pigs that are 
sacrificed, the status of each individual Tsembaga male is enhanced only in 
direct relationship to the number of pigs that he contributes. The larger the 
number of animals he can k i l l , the greater the number of guests he can enter-
tain and the larger the portions of meat he is able to present to his guests, thus 
placing them under greater obligation to assist h im in the future. Each Tsem-
baga male therefore wil l seek to bu i ld up the largest herd that his family's labor 
force can support. O n l y when he reaches that l imit w i l l he want to hold the 
feast and only when a sufficient number of men have achieved the desired 
number of pigs wi l l the community as a whole agree that it is time for the cere-
monial slaughter. It may be, as Rappaport claims, that this happens before the 
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carrying capacity of the ecosystem is exceeded and its future productivity 
degraded but, from the perspective of the actor-based model of decision mak-
ing, this happy result is no more than the summed outcome of many separate 
indiv idual decisions. 
The actor-based model, with its emphasis on the processes by which people 
make decisions about how to interact with their environment, is a valuable 
approach for understanding how change occurs in social systems in response 
to environmental perturbations. The approach is particularly useful for the 
insight it gives into why traditional farmers accept or reject agricultural inno-
vations. A study by Michae l M o c r m a n (1968) has, for example, helped to 
explain why peasant rice farmers in northern Tha i l and have adopted tractors 
under certain environmental circumstances while they continue to rely on 
water buffalo under other circumstances. Similarly, Michae l Ca l avan (1977) 
has shown how willingness of T h a i farmers to plant improved rice varieties 
reflects rational consideration of environmental forces affecting crop yields. 
These and other studies of individual decision mak ing have shown convinc-
ingly that As ian peasants arc far from being the trad it ion-bound creatures of 
the economic development textbooks. Instead, they are shown to be highly 
rational d e c i s i o n makers who carefully assess agricultural innovations in terms 
of potential benefits and costs. Despite their promise of higher yields, "mod-
e r n " c ropping methods are often rejected because such innovations may re-
quire high inputs of fertilizer, pesticides, and water. These inputs are unavaila-
ble to the poorer farmers, and modern cropping methods are also much more 
vulnerable to environmental hazards such as floods, droughts, and insect and 
disease outbreaks. 
Poor marginal farmers, who arc barely able to eke out a l iv ing with existing 
technology, simply cannot afford to take the greater risks of failure associated 
with innovative means of production. Rather than take b ig risks to maximize 
income, the farmer who has only I hectare (ha) or less of land must always 
seek to min imize risks. For h im it is better to obtain a harvest of 1,000 kilo-
grams of padi every year without fail than it is to harvest 3,000 kilograms in 
favorable years and nothing in years when environmental conditions are less 
favorable. F rom this perspective, it is easy to understand why Vietnamese 
peasants from the Red R ive r Del ta , who were notoriously conservative in 
their farming methods there, proved 1 0 be extremely receptive to agricultur-
al innovations after their resettlement in the M e k o n g Delta in 1955. These 
peasants had not miraculously become more " r a t i ona l " and less " t radit ion-
bound" simply by moving from north to south; they had increased their aver-
age landholdings from .1 ha to 5 ha per family. They could now afford to take 
the risks of experimenting on part of their land with "mirac le r ice" from the 
International R ice Research Institute ( I R R I ) , with fertilizers, insecticides, 
and even tractors, because failure no longer meant starvation. Unde r new 
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environmental conditions, these formerly conservative peasants quickly be-
came among the most innovative farmers in V i e tnam. 
Al though the actor-based model of human ecology has been usefully cm-
ployed in explaining peasant choices about environmental relations, it relies 
upon a set of questionable assumptions about humans and society. The fact 
that T h a i peasants are capable of choosing which of two rice varieties wi l l give 
op t imum yields under local environmental conditions cannot be taken as evi-
dence that humans in general always or even usually make correct decisions 
about their interactions with the environment. In its assumption that humans 
always behave rationally, the actor-based model bears many resemblances to 
the "free-market" model of the classical economists who conceived of count-
less independent individual decisions to buy or sell as operating to produce 
optimal prices in any particular supply and demand situation. Mode r n econo-
mists have largely abandoned this free-market model, aware as they are of the 
imperfections of consumer knowledge and the deliberate manipulations by 
monopolistic corporate bodies, which distort the free market. Advocates of the 
actor-based model of human ecology, however, appear to be embracing uncrit-
ically such an " A d a m S m i t h " conceptual approach with the implicit assump-
tion (hat individual farmers normally make their decisions in an ecologically 
rational way. Andrew Vayda (Vayda and M c C o y , 1975), in particular, having 
disavowed his earlier theoretical view that it is local populations that are 
adapted to ecosystems, now appears to take the position that individuals in tra-
dit ional societies generally make "correct" decisions about the use of natural 
resources so that the sum of these decisions promotes stable environmental 
relationships. 
Whi l e no anthropologist doubts that traditional peoples often have accurate 
and detailed environmental knowledge, which can allow them to make ration-
al decisions about resource use and coping with natural hazards, it must be 
strongly emphasized that there is no inherent requirement that such an end 
wil l result. In many situations, such as "the tragedy o l the commons" de-
scribed by Ga r r i u Ha rd in (1968), the summed effect of individual decisions, 
all of which are rational from the perspective of each actor, is to destroy the 
carrying capacity of the environment, thus lowering the welfare of the whole 
c ommun i ty* 
"The tragedy of the commons refers to a situation where a number of individuals share unlimited 
access to a limited dcgraduble. resource such as a communal pasture. It is in each individual's 
short-term self-interest to graze as many animals as possible on the pasture, thus ensuring per-
sonal maximum gains. This quickly leads to overgrazing, which, if continued unchecked, results 
in the degradation of productivity of the pasture, as lias occurred in much of India. Everyone 
loses, but those individuals who keep the most animals on the deteriorating range s(ill maximize 
(heir share of the declining communal resource so that overgrazing is likely to continue until the 
pasture is destroyed. Such a process can be observed currently in many upland areas in Asia. 
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It is not even va l id 1 0 assume that individuals always make rational adaptive 
choices in terms of their short-run self-interest. Recent wor ld history provides 
abundant examples of people making wrong choices for their own survival , 
H o w , for example, is it possible for anyone lo assert that humans are rational 
decision makers in the face of evidence that dur ing Wor ld War II several m i l -
lion Jews in Europe went quicdy and wi th virtually no resistance to the Naz i 
extermination camps? When the Secret Police (SS) or Gestapo knocked at the 
door each of these individuals made the decision to accept fate and go along 
peacefully—a wrong decision that repealed mill ions of times resulted in the 
near extermination o f a people. G i v e n the overwhelming mil i tary power pos-
sessed by the Nazis , it might have made no difference to the ultimate outcome 
if the Jews had decided to resist, as they finally d id in the Warsaw Ghetto 
uprising, but it is a fact that such resistance was never even considered because 
use of physical force was not condoned by Jewish culture as it had evolved in 
the ghettos of Europe. The "good m a n " was one who was peaceful and 
accommodating i n the face of force, not one who was violent and offered resis-
tance to authority. Since individuals must make decisions wi thin the context 
of their particular culture, all choices arc ultimately value statements—the 
expression of a preference for one way of life over another. Such values are, 
however, a property of the social system, not of the individual actors within the 
system. 
A n individual Tsembaga tries to raise the largest possible p ig herd, not 
because that is the op t imum strategy for adapting to the New Gu inea environ-
ment but because that is the way in which he can gain status within Tsembaga 
society; a T h a i farmer chooses to grow rice variety A instead of rice variety B 
because he believes that it w i l l give h im a higher yield from his land and a 
higher yield wi l l a l low h im to live in the style that Th a i culture considers good. 
The i r decisions may o r may not be correct ones within the context o f their cul-
tural values, but they as individuals d id not create these values. Instead, the 
values arc a pre-existing aspect of the social systems into which these ind iv idu-
als were born. As children they were socialized to accept these values as cor-
rect, and as adults they make their choices about interactions with the environ-
ment in terms of those values. The T h a i farmer does not try to accumulate a 
large herd of pigs and the Tsembaga people do not try to raise a rice crop, 
however suitable such a strategy might be from an ecological standpoint, 
because such decisions arc not even options with the frameworks of their 
respective cultures. 
A Tsembaga is concerned with raising pigs and a T h a i with growing padi 
not because of any choice made by these individuals but because iheir respec-
tive cultures channel their interests in these directions. Both ihe nature of the 
game and the rules by which it is played are set by the social system, with the 
individual actor being able only to choose his specific moves. Thus , the Tsem-
baga may strive to raise a larger or smaller herd of pigs and the T h a i may 
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plant miracle rice seed instead of the traditional variety—the social systems 
" a l l o w " the individual that much freedom of choice. Rut the larger issues o f 
life are not matters of choice. Hamlet may agonize about being and nonbeing, 
but most individuals s imply accept their existence wi thin an ongoing social 
system as given. They may try 1 0 better their situation, but they normally do 
not seek to rewrite the fundamental rules of the game as they are prescribed by 
their culture. 
The actor-based model of human ecology is thus one of l imited applicability. 
It can reveal a great deal about why individuals wi thin a particular social sys-
tem make the particular choices about interactions with the environment that 
they do, but i i cannot explain why their social system presents them with the 
particular choices it does. A n explanation of the character of a social system as 
a system cannot be achieved by looking al ihe characteristics of the individuals 
thai compose the social system. Instead, it is necessary to focus on the charac-
teristics unique 1 0 the higher order system itself as it interacts with its environ-
ment. Th i s approach is called the systems model of human ecology. 
THE SYSTEMS MODEL OF HUMAN ECOLOGY 
A major scientific development in recent years has been the formulation of 
"general systems theory," which is concerned with the general properties of the 
structures and functions of systems as such, rather than with their specific con-
tents. Accord ing to this iheoretical approach, atoms, cells, organisms, ecosys-
tems, societies, and even the universe as a whole all share the common proper-
tics of being self-organizing systems and can iherefore be studied in terms of a 
common theoretical perspective, Biological ecologists have long been aware of 
the systemic qualities o f the natural wor ld , as their use o f the t e r m ecosystem 
reveals. A m o n g social scientists, the recognition that human societies consti-
tute organized systems is also an old one, dat ing back at least to the work of the 
French sociologist Emile Du rkhc im . H is writings, particularly The E l e m e n t a r y 
F o r m s of R e l i g i o u s Life (1915), provided ihe basis for the development of the 
structural-functional social systems model that has been the dominant para-
d igm of British and Amer ican anthropology and sociology since the 1930s. 
Structural-functionalism, as first theoretically articulated by A . R . R ad -
cliffe-Brown (1965) and Bronislaw Ma l inowsk i (1922), and as developed em-
pirically by E . E . Evans-Pri tchard (1940) and especially S i r R aymond Fir th 
(1936), saw all of the diverse insti iuiions of society as being organized into an 
integrated system, where each institution fits harmoniously with every other 
one, and where change in any single institution would ramify into comple-
mentary change in all of the other institutions with which it was functionally 
connected. 
The structural-functional model, with its conception of societies as systems. 
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proved to be of great value operationally, producing many new insights into 
the ways in which societies were organized. Numerous formerly inexplicable 
customs suddenly became intelligible in the light of their functional relations 
with other institutions. The payment of "br ide pr ice" in tribal societies, for 
example, became comprehensible when ii was perceived that it served to 
strengthen marriage bonds by making divorce more difficult and that such 
strengthening was important since marriages served politically to unite other-
wise autonomous clans. Thus , what had earlier been perceived as a quaint, 
"savage" custom was now recognized as serving important functions in the 
maintenance of tribal social solidarity. 
The ethnographic works of the structural-functionalists give many more 
examples of such functional relationships. To read Evans-Pri ichard 's mono-
graph on the Nue r o f the Sudan (J940) or R aymond Firth 's several works 
(1936) on the T ikopians of Polynesia is to gain a strong conviction that these 
societies were integrated systems. Cer ta in ly most Western social scientists 
became convinced of this and thus the structural-functional model rapidly 
became the dominant theoretical perspective in anthropology and sociology. 
Soon, however, criticisms began to be heard that the structural-functional 
model was a static one, unable to explain the occurrence of change within the 
social system.* If, as the theory asserted, every institution was integrated per-
fectly with every other institution, what force could cause change to occur? 
The problem with the social system concept as developed by the structural-
functionalists was not their postulation of integration among system compo-
nents but their failure to conceive of the system as an open one. Fol lowing the 
lead of Du rkhe im (1938), it was argued that "social facts" must be explained 
only in terms of other "social facts"; one could not seek the causes of social 
change outside the boundaries of the social system itself. Th i s l imitat ion of the 
field of inqui ry—orig ina l ly conceived as a way to prevent the resort to reduc-
tionist psychological o r physiological explanations of social systems such as 
" exp l a i n ing" the development of Naz i Ge rmany in terms of Hi t ler ' s patholog-
ical personality or " exp l a in ing" the incest tabu in terms of man's instinctual 
horror of interbreeding—became an obstacle to understanding the process of 
systems change. The development of human ecology can be seen as an attempt 
to escape this theoretical impasse by treating social systems as open rather 
than closed systems. Beginning with J u l i an Steward's concepi.of cultural ecol-
ogy (1955, 1968), it was recognized that "social facts" might be explained not 
only in terms of other "social facts" but also in terms of "ecological facts." 
*Acccptancc of the view that social institutions have a tendency toward integration need not imply 
acceptance of the view that social systems arc naturally homeosiaiic and stable. The Marxist con-
ceptual model, lor example, certainly recognizes the role played by conflict in social evolution yet 
at the same lime holds that technology, social and political institutions, and ideology arc highly 
integrated phenomena at any particular stage ofeconomic growth. 
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Unfortunately, the new enthusiasm for explaining social and cultural insti-
tutions in terms of environmental influences caused some analysts to lose 
sight of the systemic character of society. Rather than seeking to understand 
how one open system (the social system) interacted with another open system 
(the ecosystem), they focused their attention on t ry ing to explain how particu-
lar institutions (e.g., sacred cows, p ig feasts) might be explained in relation to 
particular environmental conditions. That this research strategy produced 
valuable insights is without question, but it could not lead to a comprehensive 
understanding of society-environment interactions. 
A n alternative approach, the "systems model of human ecology," describes 
social systems as they interact with ecological systems. Adaptation is assumed 
to occur, not at the level of discrete cultural traits or social institutions—as in 
the model of cultural ecology—or in terms of specific human populations—as 
in the ecosystem-based model of human ecology—or in terms of specific indi -
vidual decision makers—as in the actor-based model of human ecology—but 
at the level of the total social system as a system. Cu l t u r a l trails, therefore, do 
not necessarily function to ensure the welfare of either individuals or local pop-
ulations but instead serve pr imari ly to ensure the survival of the social system 
itself. F rom this perspective, the ritually regulated warfare of the Tsembaga is 
not seen as directly benefiting either most individual Tsembaga or the Tsem-
baga local population as a whole. In just one battle eighteen died and the peo-
ple were defeated and driven from their territory, hardly what can be labeled 
an adaptive outcome either for the individual casualties or the dispossessed 
survivors. Instead, such endemic conflict is considered essential for main-
taining the type of social system characteristic of the New Gu inea highlands. 
Individuals, or even the whole Tsembaga local population could be destroyed, 
but the larger social system endured. 
In the systems model of human ecology both the social system and the eco-
system with which it interacts retain their integrity as systems, with each 
changing its structural configuration according to its internal dynamics. A t the 
same t ime, however, it is recognized that each system receives energy, mate-
r ia l , and information from the other, and these inputs also influence its struc-
ture and functioning. Each system, of course, is also open to influence from 
other systems of the same k ind so that a social system may be altered by inputs 
received from a neighboring social system (the processes anthropologists call 
diffusion and acculturation) just as an ecosystem may be changed by inputs 
from other ecosystems (e.g., migration and colonization). Causali ty in the sys-
tems model of human ecology is thus extremely complex with no primacy 
being assigned a p r i o r i to any element or force in the total system. Figure 6 is a 
s implified diagram of the basic structural and functional relationships in -
volved in the systems model of human ecology. Th i s model emphasizes four 
relational aspects: 
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1. Inputs from the ecosystem into the social system—These inputs can be 
in the form of flows of energy (e.g., food, petroleum), materials (e.g., 
protein, construction materials), or information (e.g., sounds, visual 
s t imuli) . 
2. Inputs from the social system into the ecosystem—Again, these can take 
the form of flows of energy, materials, or information generated by hu-
man activities. 
3. Change in the institutions making up the social system in response to 
inputs from the ecosystem—Such change may be either primary, as when 
an increase in the death rate due to environmentally transmitted diseases 
changes the population structure of a society, or secondary, as other social 
system institutions change in response to environmentally generated pr i -
mary change in one institution. Social system changes in response to 
inputs from the ecosystem may be and often are adaptive, that is, they 
contribute to the cont inuing survival of the social system under changed 
environmental conditions. They need not, however, result in a better or 
happier way of life for individual human participants. In other words, it 
is the social system itself, rather than the people who are involved in it, 
that is the unit of natural selection and adaptation. 
4. Changes in the ecosystem in response to inputs from the social system— 
Just as human society changes in response to environmental influences, 
so docs the ecosystem change in response to human influences. Such 
change may be either primary, the direct impact of a human activity on 
an ecosystem component such as the k i l l ing off of a particular animal spe-
cies by ovcrhunt ing, or secondary, alterations in other ecosystem compo-
nents caused by anthropogenic pr imary change in one component. 
As a brief and somewhat hypothetical example of how the systems model of 
\human ecology works, the problem of deforestation in South As ia may be 
examined. In recent years h i l l slopes in northern India have been deforested 
(ecosystems change) by overgrazing by animals and by cutting of trees and 
bushes by people for domestic cooking fuel. Th i s has resulted in a severe short-
age of fuel (flow of energy from the ecosystem to the social system). Peasant 
households have responded to this energy crisis by using their children to scav-
enge any available twigs, agricultural litter, and especially, cow dung (change 
in resource exploitation pattern). Th i s activity enhances the economic value of 
children to the household, leading parents to have more children (change in 
population). Consequent increased population results in increased human 
pressure on the productivity of the ecosystem. Intensive collection of cow dung 
(flow of energy and material from the ecosystem to the social system) has, 
however, reduced the supply of manure in the farm fields (change in soil com-
ponent of the ecosystem) with consequent lowering of crop yields (change in 
plant component of the ecosystem). Y ie lds have been reduced further by the 
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decreased dry-season flow of i rr igation water from the deforested hills and the 
clogging of i rr igation canals by soil eroded from the denuded hill slopes (sec-
ondary changes i n ecosystem components). These reduced yields are reflected 
in a decreased flow of food energy and materials to the human population with 
consequent negative consequences for nutrit ional status and health (changes 
wi thin social system institutions). 
Tf government extension agents introduce biogas generators (change in 
technology o f the social system resulting from diffusion f r o m another social 
system), concentrated organic residues are again available for use as manure 
in the fields (change in flow of material from the social system to the ecosys-
tem) wi th a consequent increase in crop yields (change in plant component of 
the ecosystem). The solution of the domestic fuel problem could lead to re-
duced fuel collection in the uplands (change in flow of energy from the eco-
system to the social system), which allows regeneration of vegetative cover, 
resulting in better water and soil retention (changes in the ecosystem), which 
improves the supply of i rr igation water to the fields leading to increased supply 
of foods for the peasants, and so on . 
Whether or not such ecological benefits actually are obtained from introduc-
tion o f the new technology, however, w i l l be strongly influenced by social 
structural factors. I f biogas plants arc sold to individual households, only the 
wealthier peasant families wi l l be able to afford them. Poorer peasants are 
l ikely to end up collecting dung to sell to the biogas plant owners for cash. The 
biogas plant owners wil l thus gain differential control of both energy and fertil-
izer supplies with consequent widening of the gap between well-off and poorer 
farmers in the village. M o r e reliable supplies of i rr igation water also are likely 
to benefit differentially the owners of larger plots l y ing wi thin the command 
area, again serving to increase economic inequality wi thin ihe communi ty 
Poorer households, having no vested interest in mainta in ing the renewed 
watershed, may even deliberately seek to sabotage the working of the irriga-
tion system. Th i s has in fact happened in the case o f (he Chandigar project 
referred to previously. 
The point o f this discussion is that the relationship between the social system 
and the ecosystem is both complex and dynamic. The virtue of the systems 
model of human ecology is that it focuses attention on the processes of change 
and adaptation rather than emphasizes the s ial ic structural characteristics of 
the social and ecological systems. Moreover , this approach avoids any neces-
sity for specification of any universal " p r ime mover" for change: neither envi-
ronmental nor social factors have any a p r i o r i p r imacy because impulses for 
change may flow in either direction. The systems model therefore overcomes 
to a large extent the l imitations of the model of cultural ecology with its lack of 
provision for dealing with environmental change caused by human activity 
The systems model also, by its careful specification of the parameters of the 
social and ecological systems as integral independent systems, avoids many of 
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ihe boundary definition problems inherent in the ecosystem-based model of 
human ecology. 
There is no inherent c o n t r a d i c t i o n between the systems model and the 
actor-based model of human ecology. The latter approach is s imply one among 
many that can be incorporated wi thin the larger social systems framework. 
Certainly, decision making by individual participants affects both the charac-
ter of the social system and its interactions with (he ecosystem, but, as has 
already been discussed, all such decisions are made wi thin the context of these 
systems. 
Perhaps the greatest virtue of (he systems model of human ecology is that it 
offers specific guidelines for doing research on human interactions with the 
environment. Rather than simply slatting with the idea that environmental 
influences must somehow affect humans or that human actions must somehow 
influence the environment, it focuses attention on the .significant areas of 
interaction between human social systems and ecological systems—the flow 
and counierl low of energy, material, and information. Such specification pro-
vides an essential framework for carrying out comparative research. Lack ing 
such a systematic model, human ecology can continue to produce only the sort 
of n d h o c results that have essentially characterized the field to date. 
CONCLUSION 
It must be emphasised that while ihe systems model provides a framework 
for analysis of human interactions with the environment, it is not intended to 
be and should never be used as an operational research model. That is, no 
investigator should simply use the model as ihe basis for making a holistic 
description of any specific community 's inieraciions with iis ecosystem. Such a 
total description would be as useless as it would be undoable in practice given 
the immense comple.xily of even the simplest social and ecological systems. 
Instead of describing systems for description's sake, it is much more reward-
ing to siart work with a specific problem as the focus of the research.* To 
return 1 0 the earlier example of deforestation in India, one could ask: " W h y 
do Indian peasants cut down too many trees?" One could equally well start 
with the question of: " H o w can soil fertility be restored?" or " H o w can the 
supply of irrigation water be increased?" or "Wha t are the likely social and 
ecological impacts of in troducing biogas generators to rural communi t ies?" 
The choice of the question is l ikely to reflect the init ial problem orientation of 
the investigator (e.g., the forester wi l l probably ini t ial ly be concerned with the 
'Carol Colfcr anil Andrew Vayda have recently advocated use of a problem-one ri fed rather than a 
cominunity-iiricntcd approach in human ecology research, referring to this .strategy as '•contex-
tual analysis" (Colfcr 1981). 
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cutt ing o f trees). Emp loy ing the systems model as the research framework, 
however, may help h im to perceive that the solution to his problem may lie 
outside the boundaries of the forest, requir ing the provision of alternative 
sources of energy to the villagers before reforestation may be feasible. 
The real value of human ecology lies in helping humans to see previously 
unrecognized relationships between what people do and the environment in 
which they do it. M a n y important insights have already been provided, 
changing in profound ways how people think about the world and their place 
wi thin it. Systematic research on human ecology has only really just begun, 
however, and areas o f ignorance far exceed areas of understanding. But that is 
why the field is such an intellectually exciting one in which to work. 
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BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTE 
Useful reviews of the development of human ecology as a field are provided 
by Anderson (1973), Bates (1953), Bennett (1976), Grossman (1977), H e lm 
(1962), Nett ing (1971, 1977), Or love (1980), Sahlins (1964), Vayda and Rap-
paport (1968), and Young( l974) . 
Prescicntific period thought on human-nature relations is described by 
Thomas (1925). Environmenta l determinism is expounded by Semple (1911), 
while the theory is crit ically reviewed by Piatt (1948) and Sprout and Sprout 
(1965). C . Dary l l Ford (1934) provided the most detailed presentation of the 
possibilist approach. The example of the distribution of maize agriculture in 
Nor th Amer i ca being l imited by climate is from A . L . Kroeber 's monumental 
C u l t u r a l a n d N a t u r a l A reas of N a t i v e N o r t h A m e r i c a (1939). 
The articles collected in Steward (1955), particularly Chapter 2, " T h e C o n -
cept and Me thod of Cu l tu ra l Ecology," as well as his later article (1968), offer 
clear statements of the model of cultural ecology. Steward's monograph, B a s i n -
P l a t e a u A b o r i g i n a l S o c i o - p o l i t i c a l G r o u p s (1938), remains one of the best examples 
of the empirical application of this model. Evans-Pritchard's monograph on 
the Nuer (1940) represents a parallel, but independent, effort. Geertz (1963) 
applies the cultural ecological approach to analysis of Indonesian agriculture. 
The sacred cows of India are discussed from the standpoint of cultural ecology 
by M a r v i n Harr is (1966, 1975), and Odend 'hal ' s empir ical study (1972) of the 
energetics of Indian cattle supports Ha r r i s ' view that they efficiently convert 
environmental resources into forms useful to man. R . O . Whyte (1968) offers 
a much less favorable assessment of the role of cattle in India. Diencr, Non i n i , 
and Robk in (1978) document the extensive ecological degradation resulting 
from overgrazing. The existence of the " p i g l i ne" as a bar to the spread of 
Islam in Borneo is reported by J . M . Bolton (1972). Information on the ef-
fects of reforestation at Chand iga r on irrigation water supplies was provided 
by P. R . M i s h r a in personal communicat ion. The Chandigar project is de-
scribed in detail in a paper by Dav id Seckler (1979). 
The ecosystem-based model was formulated by A . P. Vayda and R . A . 
Rappaport (1968) under the label of "general ecology." Rappaport (1968, 
1971) presents additional theoretical discussions of this approach, while his 
monograph, P i g s f o r t h e A n c e s t o r s (1968), is the major empirical employment of 
the model. Margaret M a c A r t h u r (1974) raises serious objections, however, to 
his interpretation of nutrit ional data while Anderson (1973) questions the suit-
ability of the local population as the unit of ecological analysis. 
B . S. Or love (1980) presents the clearest discussion of the actor-based mo-
del of human ecology and the label itself was suggested by h im. A . P. Vayda 
and B . J . M c C a y (1975) also assert thai the proper focus of human ecology 
should be on individual decision making regarding adaptation to environmen-
tal hazards, a view given theoretical support from the standpoint of current 
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perspectives in biological evolutionary theory by P .J . Richerson (1977). 
A . W. Johnson (1972) states the case for the importance of individual decision 
making with regard to agricultural innovation, while M . Moerman (1968) 
and M . M . Calavan (1977) present empirical case studies demonstrating the 
"rationality" with which Thai peasants make decisions. Observations regard-
ing Northern Vietnamese resettled in the Mekong Delta are from the author's 
unpublished field notes. G . Hardin's (1968) paper, "The Tragedy of the Com-
mons," points out that individual decisions often in sum lead to environmental 
disaster. That individuals may make erroneous choices is documented in chill-
ing detail in Raul Hilberg's monograph, The Destruction of the E u r o p e a n Jews 
(1961). That there is a real distinction between survival of the individual or 
populations of individuals and the survival of whole cultural systems is a point 
clearly made in P. Diener's (1974) essay on the Hufterites. 
There is no adequate single treatment of the systems model of human ecol-
ogy. L . Von Bertalanffy (1968) remains the basic work on general systems the-
ory while E . Laszio (1972) offers one of the more readable introductions to an 
often jargon-laden school of thought. E . P. Odum(1971, 1977) presents a sys-
tems view of ecology with particular emphasis on the integrity of the ecosystem 
as an analytic unit, an integrity that is questioned by P. A . Colinvaux (1973). 
E. Durkheim (1915) is the precursor of structural-functional approaches to 
society. That social facts can be explained only in terms of other social facts is 
the theme of his Rules of Sociological M e t h o d (1938). A. R. Radcliffe-Brown's 
collected essays (1965) present the structural-functional approach as developed 
by social anthropologists. Leslie White (1975) advances the thesis that adapta-
tion occurs at the level of the social or cultural system rather than at the indi-
vidual level. James Dow (1976) presents mathematical models for analyzing 
the flow of energy, materials, and information between social and ecological 
systems while the present author (Rambo 1982) explores more qualitative 
applications of the systems model of human ecology to research on Southeast 
Asian agricultural societies. 
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